

# The Controversy Between Schelling and Jacobi

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SCHELLING, ALONG WITH FICHTE, has suffered the fate of being labelled one of Hegel's predecessors. Richard Kroner provides the classic expression of this viewpoint in his monumental study, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, which examines Schelling's thought primarily for its contribution to Hegel's final synthesis.<sup>1</sup> In English we have Josiah Royce's sympathetic and lively account of Schelling's early romantic exuberance, regarded as a transitional stage in the development of German idealism.<sup>2</sup> But this emphasis on the early Schelling has led to an unfortunate neglect of his work subsequent to the break with Hegel in 1807. Schelling's romanticism, so ably documented by E. D. Hirsch, Jr.,<sup>3</sup> can only be regarded as one phase in the total sweep of his thought, for, after the break with Hegel, Schelling produced at least three major works: the essay *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*,<sup>4</sup> wrestling with the problem of evil and human freedom, the fragmentary *Weltalter*,<sup>5</sup> which in scope and dialectical intricacy should be compared with Hegel's *Logic*, and the *Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung*,<sup>6</sup> furnishing a fundamental critique of the whole dialectical enterprise. Save for the essay on human freedom, however, none of these works were published during his lifetime, as Schelling withdrew from the public eye after his controversies with Hegel and Jacobi. Thus the publishing histories of Schelling and Hegel are exactly reverse. Schelling rushed into print his early speculative gropings, while Hegel suppressed his,<sup>7</sup> making the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* his first major publication. Then while Hegel's *Logic* and *Encyclopedia* were being publicly acclaimed, Schelling remained silent. This accident of history is largely responsible for the illusion that Schelling is the older of the two

<sup>1</sup> (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1921-24), 2 vols.

<sup>2</sup> *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1892), Lecture VI, 164-189.

<sup>3</sup> *Wordsworth and Schelling, A Typological Study of Romanticism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), Yale Studies in English, Vol. CXLV.

<sup>4</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freyheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände*, 1809. Reprinted in the *Sämmtliche Werke*, Erste Abtheilung, VII. Band (Stuttgart und Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856), 331-416. English translation by James Gutmann: *Of Human Freedom* (Chicago: Open Court, 1936).

<sup>5</sup> Three fragmentary versions of the *Weltalter* have been published. The *Urfassungen* of 1811 and 1813 were edited by Manfred Schröter and published as a separate Nachlassband to the *Münchener Jubiläumsausgabe* of the collected works: *Die Weltalter, Fragmente* (Munich: Biederstein, Leibniz, 1946). A later version is published in *S.W.* I: 8, pp. 195-344, which has been translated by Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr.: *The Ages of the World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942).

<sup>6</sup> *Philosophie der Mythologie* is published in *S.W.* II: 1-2; *Philosophie der Offenbarung* in *S.W.* II: 3-4.

<sup>7</sup> These essays were first collected and published by Herman Nohl in *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen: 1907). T. M. Knox translated them into English, with an introduction by Richard Kroner; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Early Theological Writings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

thinkers (actually he was five years Hegel's junior), who retired from the philosophical scene after making his contribution to the Hegelian synthesis.

Paul Tillich's doctoral dissertations<sup>8</sup> and Ernst Cassirer's studies in post-Kantian thought<sup>9</sup> made serious inroads on this conception, yet the illusion persisted. Their insistence on the importance of the later Schelling has been brilliantly sustained by two recent studies: Horst Fuhrmans's *Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter*<sup>10</sup> and Walter Schulz's *Die Vollenendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings*,<sup>11</sup> and we may hope that the conventional estimate of Schelling will be drastically revised. Fuhrmans has demonstrated that the split between the early and the later Schelling must be placed in the year 1806 when he came in contact with Franz von Baader in Munich, who encouraged him to delve deeper into the theological and cosmological ramifications of Jacob Boehme's thought.<sup>12</sup> The re-orientation this caused is apparent in the essay on human freedom, published in 1809, but it was not fully exploited until the period of *die Weltalter* (1811-1819). Schulz has carefully examined the *Philosophie der Offenbarung* (1830-44) to show the many strands of continuity between late German idealism and existentialism. Kierkegaard's attack on Hegel was anticipated on many counts by Schelling's own internal critique of the idealistic concept of reason and subjectivity. As these studies demonstrate, Schelling's originality can be readily appreciated once we free ourselves from the stereotyped "Kant-to-Hegel" pattern of thinking.

For this reason, Arthur O. Lovejoy's brief discussion in *The Great Chain of Being*<sup>13</sup> remains the most exciting interpretation of Schelling available in English. These nine pages do Schelling the honor of placing his thought in the most appropriate context, one which displays those characteristic strengths of his thought which had been ignored by the conventional approach. Lovejoy and Schelling are concerned with the same problem: how to give ultimate significance to the world if God is to be regarded as completely self-sufficient. Lovejoy isolates two conflicting strands in Western speculation concerning God and his creation. The first identifies

<sup>8</sup> Tillich wrote two dissertations, the first for the doctorate in philosophy, the other for the Licentiate in theology: *Die religionsgeschichtliche Konstruktion in Schellings positiver Philosophie, ihre Voraussetzungen und Prinzipien* (Breslau: 1910), 143 pp. *Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung* (Halle: 1912), 135 pp. The influence of Schelling on Tillich's own thought has been documented by Tillich in his article, "Schelling und die Anfänge des existentialistischen Protestes," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, IX (1955), 197-208. His essay on "The Idea and the Ideal of Personality" in *The Protestant Era* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 115-135, and the discussion of the Fall in the *Systematic Theology*, II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 29-44, may be profitably read as indirect commentaries on Schelling's essay on human freedom.

<sup>9</sup> *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, Dritter Band, *Die nachkantischen Systeme* (Berlin: Verlag Bruno Cassirer, 1923), 217-284. [This essay, the only essay on Schelling which Cassirer published, gives a positive evaluation of Schelling's critique of Hegel (pp. 279-282), but does not develop the fuller appreciation of the late Schelling that Cassirer evidently presented in the classroom.]

<sup>10</sup> (Düsseldorf: L. Schwann, 1954), 469 pp.

<sup>11</sup> (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1955), 306 pp.

<sup>12</sup> As distinguished from the implications of Boehme's thought for the philosophy of nature. The early Schelling had been aware of the vitalistic tradition of polar opposition (Boehme, Paracelsus, Bengel), particularly as expressed in the writings of Friedrich Christoph Oetinger. He had employed this notion of polar opposition quite extensively in his own philosophy of nature. See Robert Schneider, *Schellings und Hegels schwäbische Geistesahnen* (Würzburg-Aumühle: Konrad Tritsch Verlag, 1939). Diss. Bonn 1938.

<sup>13</sup> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), pp. 317-326.

God's perfection with his self-sufficiency and immutability, while the second seeks to give the world a positive evaluation by declaring it to be a spontaneous manifestation of divine goodness. But what is the logic of such a spontaneous manifestation? Would this divine goodness be just as perfect if it never manifested itself? If so, then why was the world created? On the other hand, if we explain the creation on the grounds that God's goodness would otherwise lack fulfillment, then we endanger his self-sufficient perfection. All the major thinkers (Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz) have insisted upon divine self-sufficiency, but Lovejoy is able to point out elements in their affirmation of the created order which lead to difficulties. Lovejoy evidently believes that the conflict between these two strands of speculation is irresolvable unless the identification of divine perfection with self-sufficiency is rejected. Schelling was willing to make this rejection by revising the concept of divine perfection to include dynamic self-transformation as well as self-manifestation within a created order.

The brilliance of this assessment of Schelling's significance stands in marked contrast to Lovejoy's account of the historical situation which led Schelling to reject the notion of divine self-sufficiency. Lovejoy first notes the ambiguity of his earlier philosophizing. "In much of his philosophizing between 1800 and 1812, it is true, he has still two Gods and therefore two religions—the religion of a time-transcending and eternally complete Absolute, an 'Identity of Identities,' the One of Neoplatonism—and the religion of a struggling, temporally limited, gradually self-realizing World-Spirit or Life-Force."<sup>14</sup> This is true, at least until 1809, for Schelling's enthusiasm for Boehme did introduce conflicting elements which were not immediately resolved. The essay on human freedom boldly emphasized God's participation in becoming, even declaring that God was involved both in suffering and in the vicissitudes of fate, though vestiges of the Neoplatonic absolute are also apparent. "The two theologies still subsist side by side; but one of them is a survival, the other is an innovating idea which is on the point of destroying the former."<sup>15</sup> At this point Lovejoy goes on to argue that it was Schelling's controversy with Jacobi in 1812 which provided the necessary catalyst, resolving the conflict in favor of a purely evolutionary theism.

We contend that Jacobi's book, *Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung*, was not intended as an attack on Schelling, still less as a criticism of his emerging theory of evolutionary theism; that Schelling's violent response simply reflected a position he had already been developing privately prior to the provocation from Jacobi; and that Schelling never espoused a purely evolutionary doctrine with respect to God. Lovejoy's reconstruction, moreover, is based on several significant factual errors, which stand as yet uncorrected. While it is true that he returned to Jacobi and Schelling in his recent study, *The Reason, the Understanding, and Time*,<sup>16</sup> Lovejoy confined himself to the earlier, "romantic" phase of Schelling's thought, and did not re-examine the later controversy.

We propose to offer a sketch of the Schelling-Jacobi controversy to support

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 317.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 320.

<sup>16</sup> (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), 227 pp.

these criticisms of Lovejoy. On the whole, however, we remain impressed with Lovejoy's over-all evaluation. His intuitive grasp of the central thrust and significance of Schelling's thought is still valid despite its faulty historical foundation.

## I

Before we turn to the controversy itself, we must acquaint ourselves with Schelling's adversary, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. Though forgotten today, Jacobi was extremely influential at the time. He was then President of the Academy of Sciences in Munich, and widely regarded as the "pope of philosophy."<sup>17</sup> The orthodox applauded his defense of the faith against the ravages of Kantianism.

Jacobi's debate with Moses Mendelssohn concerning Lessing's pantheism some thirty years before was primarily responsible for the romantic revival of Spinoza's thought. "Revival" is not really the right word, for this was actually the first time at all that Spinoza received widespread attention in intellectual circles. Lessing had become interested in Spinoza on his own and insisted that he should not be treated "like a dead dog." Jacobi had visited Lessing briefly during the summer of 1780, shortly before his death. During their conversations, Lessing declared himself a Spinozist and embraced the formula "Εν και παν" as more suitable for his own religious faith than the "orthodox" concepts of Deity.<sup>18</sup> That these brief and rather cryptic remarks meant Lessing was a Spinozistic pantheist (as Jacobi insisted) was stoutly denied by Mendelssohn. During the course of the debate, which resulted in four book-length replies and numerous periodical articles, Jacobi formulated a very influential interpretation of Spinoza.

Mendelssohn conceded that Lessing accepted pantheism, but of a very ethereal and harmless variety. "Refined pantheism can be compatible with the truths of religion and morality, for the difference merely consists in very subtle speculation which hasn't the slightest influence on human conduct or happiness."<sup>19</sup> Lessing's pantheism should not be confused with Spinoza's, which Leibniz and Wolff had already refuted. Jacobi had missed the tentative manner in which Lessing had expressed himself, for he had aligned himself with Spinoza only when confronted by Jacobi with the crude alternatives, orthodoxy or Spinozism. Spinozism is just the first step toward an adequate pantheism, and it must be supplemented by an adequate appreciation for the dynamic character of nature.

Jacobi, on the other hand, recognized the inner consistency of Spinoza's position. He was convinced that Spinozism represented the most consistent system of pantheism which could be devised, and that it was irrefutable on rationalistic grounds.<sup>20</sup> If Lessing were a pantheist in any sense, then, he must either be a Spinozist or tend towards Spinozism to the degree that his thought was internally consistent.

<sup>17</sup> F. W. J. von Schelling (ed. Horst Fuhrmans), *Briefe und Dokumente*, Band I, 1775-1809 (Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co., 1962), 351.

<sup>18</sup> Heinrich Scholz, ed., *Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelssohn* (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1916), pp. 74-92.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39: "Auch habe ich . . . gezeigt, dass der verfeinerte Pantheismus gar wohl mit den Wahrheiten der Religion und der Sittenlehre bestehen könne, dass der Unterschied blos in einer überfeinen Speculation bestehe, die auf menschliche Handlungen und Glückseligkeit nicht den mindesten Einfluss hat, . . ."

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xxix.

While Spinoza's logic is impeccable, his system excludes both divine personality and human freedom. Since Jacobi insisted that any adequate philosophy must account for both of these, Spinoza's failure to comply amply demonstrates the bankruptcy of his approach. This jeopardizes the whole rationalistic movement, for Spinozism is its final product. Leibniz and Wolff, in particular, were only imperfect versions of rationalism. If their reasoning were carried through to its logical conclusion, it would fully agree with Spinoza. Nor is rationalism merely the expression of a particular philosophical epoch. It represents the highest endeavor of human reason to formulate a coherent account of reality. Human reason, therefore, has failed and must fail, for it can only make necessary inferences from a single presuppositionless principle. This presuppositionless principle remains far too abstract; it cannot be the transcendent personal creator of all things. Since this personal God is the true *prius*, rationalism offers us a false *prius*. Furthermore, if necessary inference from the rationalistic *prius* were to exhaust the nature of reality, there would be no place for individual human freedom.

In order to account for those elements excluded by rationalism, Jacobi posited an extra-rational human faculty, initially designated as feeling, which enabled man to have an intuitive awareness of the nature of reality. Kant's first *Critique* caused Jacobi to modify his terminology a bit, but not his fundamental position. Understanding, rather than reason, became the human faculty incapable of apprehending true reality, since its role was limited to the constitution of sensible intuitions, and neither its *a priori* structure nor the sensible intuitions themselves contain any awareness of divine personality or human freedom.

Just as there is a sensible intuition, an intuition by means of the senses, there is also a rational intuition by means of reason. Each stands over against the other as an independent source of knowledge, for neither may be derived from the other. This same relationship holds with respect to the understanding, and hence with respect to rational proof. There can be no proof of sensible intuition, since every method of proof consists in tracing concepts back to the (pure or empirical) sensible intuitions which authenticate them. Sensible intuitions constitute the beginning and the end of our knowledge of nature; they are valid unconditionally, absolutely. For the same reason no proof can be given rejecting the rational intuition upon which our knowledge of that which is beyond this world is based, and which gives us certainty of its reality and truth.<sup>21</sup>

Without this second faculty of rational intuition, then, there would be no knowledge of a personal God or of human freedom, and any philosophical system which ignores this faculty is bound to end up in a deterministic pantheism such as Spinoza's.

<sup>21</sup> F. H. Jacobi, "Vorrede, zugleich Einleitung in des Verfassers sämtliche philosophische Schriften," first published in *Werke, Zweyter Band* (Leipzig: Gerhard Fleischer d. Jüng., 1815), p. 59: "Wie es eine sinnliche Anschauung giebt, eine Anschauung durch den Sinn, so giebt es auch eine rationale Anschauung durch die Vernunft. Beyde stehen als eigentliche Erkenntnisquellen einander gegenüber, und es lässt sich eben so wenig die letztere aus der ersteren, als die erstere aus der letzteren ableiten. Eben so stehen beyde zu dem Verstande, und in so fern auch zu der Demonstration, in gleichem Verhältniss. Der sinnlichen Anschauung entgegen gilt keine Demonstration, indem alles Demonstriren nur ein Zurückführen des Begriffes auf die ihn bewahrende (empirische oder reine) sinnliche Anschauung ist: diese ist in Beziehung auf Naturerkenntnis das Erste und Letzte, das unbedingt Geltende, das Absolute. Aus demselben Grunde gilt auch keine Demonstration wider die rationale oder Vernunftanschauung, die uns der Natur jenseitige Gegenstände zu erkennen giebt, d.h. ihre Wirklichkeit und Wahrheit uns gewiss macht."

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Jacobi in effect introduces the intellectual intuition which Kant had excluded. He was able to accept Kant's strictures against understanding, while at the same time providing an acceptable alternative for those who needed more tangible evidence of God, freedom, and immortality than Kant was able to give. This was enough to insure his popularity among the orthodox. But his critical views, especially with respect to Spinoza, received even more widespread acceptance. It became quite fashionable to regard Spinoza as the most consistent proponent of one kind of philosophy, the wrong kind. Thus Fichte could write that there were only two fully rigorous systems of philosophy, his own and Spinoza's.<sup>22</sup> Everyone continued to reject Spinoza, but Jacobi made it possible for a thinker to take Spinoza seriously.

Not even Schelling scorned Jacobi's estimate of Spinoza.<sup>23</sup> Two of his earliest works, *Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie*<sup>24</sup> and *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus*,<sup>25</sup> both published in 1795, probably owe more to Jacobi than to Fichte. As the second title indicates, Schelling contrasts the two possible philosophical positions, identifying the most consistent form of "dogmatism" with Spinozism.<sup>26</sup>

II

In the course of 1797 Jacobi accepted a commission to write an announcement-review for the *Hamburger Correspondenten* of the sixth volume of Matthias Claudius' collected writings. He knew Claudius well, having earlier entrusted his two sons to him for their education—an unobtrusive way to help support a struggling author. Jacobi deeply sympathized with his pietistic leanings, though Claudius never used his religious convictions as a philosophical club wielded against his opponents, the way Jacobi was wont to do. The volume was a potpourri of epigrams, satirical essays, poems, essays on raising children and on immortality, but Jacobi was particularly attracted by a dialogue on religion, entitled "Rencontre," in which both proponents and opponents of religion despair of proving their point rationally but appeal to the certainty of their inner feeling. Jacobi wanted to use Claudius' views on faith as a springboard for developing his own position, but the review grew to unmanageable proportions. The book itself appeared in January, 1798,<sup>27</sup> but Jacobi's review was delayed some thirteen years. First he got embroiled in the

<sup>22</sup> Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer* (Jena und Leipzig: Gabler, 1794), p. 14: "Ich bemerke noch, dass man, wenn man das *Ich bin* überschreitet, nothwendig auf den Spinozismus kommen muss! . . . und dass es nur zwei völlig consequente Systeme giebt; das *kritische*, welches diese Grenze anerkennt, und das *spinozische*, welches sie überspringt."

<sup>23</sup> *S.W.* I: 1, p. 185, n. 1, makes it evident that Schelling was familiar with Jacobi's study of Spinoza by 1795.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 149-244.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 281-341.

<sup>26</sup> It is very doubtful whether Schelling was already aware of Fichte's statement about Spinoza in the *Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre* of 1794 when he wrote *Vom Ich*.

<sup>27</sup> *Asmus omnia sua secum portans, oder Sämmtliche Werke des Wandsbecker-Bothen*, VI. Theil. (Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1798). Claudius' pen-name "Asmus" is thought to be a shortened form of Erasmus. The second pen-name is taken from the local paper he had edited in Wandsbeck near Hamburg. The Latin title alludes to Simonides' remark after his shipwreck: "Omnia mea necum porto."

atheism dispute which led to Fichte's dismissal from Jena,<sup>28</sup> then he decided to expand the second part to include general observations "concerning religious realism and idealism." This greatly expanded review of Claudius was finally offered to the public on October 5, 1811,<sup>29</sup> by the title, *Von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung*.<sup>30</sup> This was the book that precipitated the Schelling-Jacobi controversy.

Schelling already had a personal animosity against Jacobi, and was predisposed against the work. On November 12, 1811, he wrote his friend Karl J. H. Windischmann:

President Jacobi's *On Divine Things and Their Revelation* will appear shortly, if it has not already. It is hard to see how the divine things found opportunity to engage this man, who is so fully and yet so undivinely employed. They certainly did not seek him out in the ante-chambers or in the dining halls of the great. This man (who knows how to deceive the world so well) has an amazing arrogance joined with such an absence of compassion and courage that it takes six years' observation to really appreciate. No doubt the world will once more be preached the reprobate doctrine of know-nothing, with pious condemnations of the godlessness of our pantheism and atheism. I hope he will be attacked on many fronts. The damage he has caused and continues to cause is unbelievable.<sup>31</sup>

It is not at all obvious that Jacobi reciprocated Schelling's feelings. Schelling complained of his underhanded tactics, his hypocritical gestures of friendship, his devious device of letting his disciples make the attack for him,<sup>32</sup> but all this may simply indicate that Schelling had no tangible evidence of Jacobi's ill will. We do know that Jacobi took Schelling's attack very hard, suffering a relapse<sup>33</sup> and resigning the presidency, and that Georgii in Stuttgart found Schelling's reaction all out of proportion to the cause.<sup>34</sup> Jacobi's book, at any rate, cannot be reasonably construed as a concentrated attack upon Schelling, even indirectly. For the most

<sup>28</sup> See Jacobi's polemic, *Jacobi an Fichte* (Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1799).

<sup>29</sup> Not 1812, as Lovejoy reports, p. 321. Schelling's reply was published in 1812.

<sup>30</sup> (Leipzig: Gerhard Fleischer dem Jüngern, 1811), 222 pp.

<sup>31</sup> G. L. Plitt, ed., *Aus Schellings Leben, In Briefen, Zweiter Band, 1803-1820* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1870), p. 270: "Nächstens erscheint oder ist schon erschienen: *Über die göttlichen Dinge und deren Offenbarung* von Hrn. Präsident Jacobi. Es ist schwer abzusehen, wie die göttlichen Dinge Zeit gefunden, bei einem so viel und so gar nicht göttlich beschäftigten Manne vorzukommen. In den Vorzimmern und an den Speisetischen der Grossen haben sie ihn doch gewiss nicht aufgesucht. Es liegt in diesem Manne, der die Welt trefflich zu täuschen verstand, eine ungläubliche Anmassung sammt verhältnismässiger Leerheit des Herzens und Geistes, die man aus sechsjähriger Anschauung kennen muss, um sie zu begreifen. Unstreitig wird der Welt wieder die heillose Lehre des Nichtwissens vorgepredigt, mit frommen Verwünschungen der Gottlosigkeit unseres Pantheismus und Atheismus. Ich wünsche sehr, dass ihm von mehreren Seiten begegnet werde. Er hat ungläublichen Schaden gestiftet und stiftet ihn noch."

<sup>32</sup> See his replies to Eberhard Friedrich Georgii, an eminent Württemberg jurist, of Jan. 14 and Dec. 8, 1812 (*ibid.*, pp. 280f., 331) and his apologetic defense to Pauline Gotter (shortly to become his second wife) of Jan. 15, 1812 (p. 284).

<sup>33</sup> See Per Daniel Amadeus Atterbom, *Menschen und Städte, Begegnungen und Beobachtungen eines schwedischen Dichters in Deutschland, Italien, und Österreich 1817-19*, neu herausgegeben von C. M. Schröder (Hamburg bei Duck, 1947), pp. 126f. Atterbom describes a visit with the 74-year-old Jacobi in Munich on January 19, 1818, mentioning in passing: "Jacobi wurde krank vom Lesen der Schellingschen Schrift gegen ihn und geriet dem Tode nahe; dies konnten Jacobis Schwestern, die bei ihm wohnen, natürlicherweise dem Schelling nie verzeihen, von dem sie überdies behaupten, dass er nicht bloss in wissenschaftlicher, sondern auch in persönlicher Beziehung sich undankbar gegen ihren Bruder aufgeführt habe."

<sup>34</sup> Schelling to Georgii, December 8, 1812, records Georgii's view that "die Reaction in dem Buch über Jacobi nicht im Verhältnis der Action, zu viel Leidenschaft u.s.w. [ist]."

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part he is concerned with other things, particularly with his own supposed extension of Kantian principles, and many of his comments appear to be merely asides.<sup>35</sup>

Schelling is never mentioned by name, but his position is criticized in *Von den göttlichen Dingen* along with Fichte's. Jacobi discusses the two daughters of the critical philosophy, the first being the *Wissenschaftslehre*. The second daughter, he found, "completely removed the distinction between natural and moral philosophy (the distinction between necessity and freedom) which the first had permitted to remain, and without further ado declared that there was nothing beyond nature, which alone existed."<sup>36</sup> Thirty pages later, he concludes that this doctrine of "naturalism" may have its scientific justification, but it must be clearly distinguished from theology, lest anyone be deceived. "It must never desire to speak of God and divine things, of freedom, of moral good and evil, of true ethics; for according to its innermost convictions these things do not exist, and whatever it says about them could not be truthfully intended. Whoever should do so would be lying."<sup>37</sup>

Schelling's hypersensitivity to this criticism is borne out by the subtitle of his reply, which speaks of Jacobi's "accusation of a purposely deceitful and lying atheism." Ever since 1803 he had been at work trying to develop the implications of his thought for morality and religion, and now Jacobi was rejecting the whole enterprise out of hand. Jacobi did reject it, but his critique is neither very malicious nor penetrating. It lacks the devastating quality of Hegel's remark that the philosophy of identity resembled "the night in which all cows are black."<sup>38</sup> The generic quality of Jacobi's objections must be noted; they are basically the old ones he had raised against Spinoza. Schelling was too reliant upon the power of discursive reason.<sup>39</sup> His attempt to apply the dialectical categories derived from the study of nature to divine things was impermissible, since our knowledge of higher things must be dependent upon a totally different source. The monistic character of the philosophy of identity might well remove the possibility of a personal encounter

<sup>35</sup> See, for instance, the brief mention of Schelling's "Alleinheitslehre" on p. 127 of *Von den göttlichen Dingen*, or the description of the "Naturphilosophie" on p. 139. Schelling quotes the latter passage inaccurately in his reply (*S.W.* I: 8, p. 26), and it is not clear whether Jacobi actually intended any criticism.

<sup>36</sup> *Von den göttlichen Dingen*, pp. 117 f.: "Gleich darauf, da die zweyte Tochter der kritischen Philosophie, die von der ersten noch stehen gelassene Unterscheidung zwischen Natur- und Moralphilosophie, Nothwendigkeit und Freyheit vollends, d.h. auch nahmentlich aufhob, und ohne weiteres erklärte: über der Natur sey nichts, und sie allein sey, erregte dies schon gar kein Staunen mehr."

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 154 f.: "Er muss nie reden wollen auch von Gott und göttlichen Dingen, nicht von Freyheit, von sittlich Gutem und Bösem, von eigentlicher Moralität; denn nach seiner innersten Überzeugung sind diese Dinge nicht, und von ihnen redend sagt er, was er in Wahrheit nicht meint. Wer aber solches thut, der redet Lüge."

<sup>38</sup> Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), p. 79.

<sup>39</sup> At no other time in his career was Schelling so confirmed a rationalist. In the *Weltalter* (*S.W.* I: 8, pp. 203 f.), he abandons the use of intellectual intuition as a basis for deductive argumentation, but he had not yet come to appreciate the significance of history and historical revelation. In later years (1827), he was willing to give Jacobi credit for this insight. *S.W.* I: 10, p. 186: "Indess kann ich Jacobi gewiss nicht mehr Gerechtigkeit widerfahren lassen, als indem ich ihm zugestehe, dass er von allen neueren Philosophen am lebhaftesten das Bedürfniss einer geschichtlichen Philosophie (in unserem Sinn) empfunden hat."



between creature and Creator.<sup>40</sup> In this monism Jacobi sees the strongest similarity between Schelling and Spinoza,<sup>41</sup> and his accusation of atheism might be simply a transfer of his judgment upon Spinoza. These criticisms, moreover, particularly the charge of monism, are more appropriately directed at the early Schelling (1795–1806) who had not yet encountered Boehme's dynamic dualism.

### III

There is nothing to indicate, as Lovejoy suggests, that Jacobi's critique was occasioned by the radical turn of Schelling's thought after 1806. After discussing the strands of evolutionary theism in the essay on human freedom,<sup>42</sup> Lovejoy devotes a paragraph to "Schelling's friend and disciple, the naturalist Oken," who practically identifies God with the temporal evolutionary process culminating in man. While Lorenz Oken may have been a student of Schelling's, Schelling did not accept his views, and described him as an "anatomical materialist."<sup>43</sup> By implication, at least, Lovejoy lumps the two men together and adds: "These early manifestations of an approximation to radical evolutionism in theology were not permitted to pass unchallenged. . . . F. H. Jacobi published in 1812 an essay, *Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung*, which was chiefly devoted to a vehement and (as Schelling afterwards described it) tearful attack upon this new way of thinking."<sup>44</sup> It may have seemed so to Schelling, but his is hardly an objective account of Jacobi's book. Lovejoy's remarks imply that Jacobi's polemic was a direct response to the recent appearance of Schelling's essay *On Human Freedom* (1809) and Oken's *Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie* (1810), but there is no evidence that Jacobi had yet read either work. *Von den göttlichen Dingen* never mentions Oken, either directly or indirectly, and we can be sure Jacobi would not have hesitated to reject Oken's views with vehemence, had he known them. Neither the essay *On Human Freedom* nor the earlier anticipatory essay *Philosophie und Religion* (1804)<sup>45</sup> is referred to. Several years later, to be sure, Jacobi offered a detailed critique of *On Human Freedom*, but only after the dispute with Schelling had thrust the work upon him.<sup>46</sup>

Jacobi need not have known of Schelling's post-1806 thought at all to write his critique, except in the vague way of hearing that the Schelling whom he knew from the earlier writings on *Naturphilosophie* and *Identitätsphilosophie* was now dealing with topics such as God, providence, and human freedom, topics which, as a "naturalist," he had no right to deal with. The imprecision of Jacobi's refer-

<sup>40</sup> *Von den göttlichen Dingen*, pp. 118; 160.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193.

<sup>42</sup> Lovejoy, pp. 318–320.

<sup>43</sup> P. D. A. Atterbom, *op. cit.*, p. 121, reports that in 1818 neither Schelling nor Baader was very happy with Oken. "Schelling sagte mir einst über Oken, dass dieser ein gelehrter und tätiger Mann, ein kundiger Zoologe und ein heller Kopf wäre, nur litte er an zwei falschen Haupteinbildungen: die eine, ein echter Deutscher zu sein, während er im Grunde seiner Natur der ärgste Franzos wäre, und die andere, ein dynamischer Naturphilosoph zu sein, während er doch nur ein anatomischer Materialist wäre—natürlich gegen eigenes Wissen und Wollen."

<sup>44</sup> Lovejoy, p. 321.

<sup>45</sup> *Philosophie und Religion*, Reprinted in *S.W.* I: 6, pp. 11–70.

<sup>46</sup> *Werke*, Zweyter Band, pp. 77–93.

ences makes it difficult to trace his sources,<sup>47</sup> but apparently he only knew of two essays written by Schelling after 1802 when he wrote *Von den göttlichen Dingen*: an 1806 review of Fichte's latest book<sup>48</sup> and the well-known oration *On the Relation of the Creative Arts to Nature* (1807) which Jacobi doubtless heard in his capacity as President of the Academy of Sciences.<sup>49</sup> In his reply, Schelling even wondered whether Jacobi had used this academic oration as the primary source for his knowledge of Schelling's system.<sup>50</sup> Jacobi is also chided for ignoring the objective demonstration of divine personality in the essay *On Human Freedom*.<sup>51</sup> Schelling's heavy reliance on his own *Presentation of my System of Philosophy* (1801) in correcting Jacobi's misunderstandings indicates his implicit awareness that Jacobi's critique was directed against these earlier writings.<sup>52</sup>

Lovejoy, however, has two very impressive quotations from Jacobi's essay apparently indicating that an attack was made upon the emerging concept of Divine evolution in Schelling's thought: "There can be only two principal classes of philosophers: those who regard the more perfect (*Vollkommnere*) as derived from, as gradually developed out of, the less perfect, and those who affirm that the most perfect being was first, and that all things have their source in him; that the first principle of all things was a moral being, an intelligence willing and acting with wisdom—a Creator—God."<sup>53</sup> Jacobi, Lovejoy implies, is here contrasting an evolutionary concept of God with the orthodox view. He then argues that Jacobi rejects this evolutionary concept because it contravenes formal logic by permitting the superior to be produced by the inferior. For "always and necessarily a *Beweisgrund* [premise] must be above that which is to be proved by means of it; it is from the *Beweisgrund* that truth and certitude are imparted to those things which are demonstrated by means of it; from it they borrow their reality."<sup>54</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Jacobi frequently alludes to Naturalismus, Identitätsphilosophie, System der absoluten Identität, Alleinheitslehre, Naturlehre, Naturphilosophie, etc., but gives only one specific reference to Schelling's works. On page 118, he refers to the *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus* (S.W. I; 1, pp. 281-341) which appeared in 1795.

<sup>48</sup> This review of J. G. Fichte's *Über das Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheinung im Gebiete der Freyheit* appeared in the *Jenische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* for June 26-27, 1806 (Nr. 151-152, cols. 585-598). It is not reprinted in Schelling's *Sämtliche Werke*. We infer Jacobi was already acquainted with it from the 1816 preface to his *Werke, Dritter Band*, p. 249.

<sup>49</sup> *Über das Verhältniss der bildenden Künste zu der Natur*. Reprinted in S.W. I: 7, pp. 289-329. Jacobi, pp. 156-160, discusses the idea of productivity as developed in this oration, and on p. 157 quotes a brief passage without mentioning its source. Schelling supplies the reference to S.W. I: 7, p. 293 in his reply.

<sup>50</sup> S.W. I: 8, p. 29: "Ist diese noch öfter vorkommende akademische Rede vielleicht die Hauptquelle, aus welcher Hr. Jacobi seine Kenntniss meines Systems geschöpft hat?"

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>52</sup> *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* appeared in the *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik* edited by Schelling and Hegel, and is reprinted in S.W. I: 4, pp. 105-202. Schelling uses this work in his reply, S.W. I: 8, pp. 25 ff.

<sup>53</sup> Lovejoy, p. 321, quoting Jacobi, pp. 149 f.: "Es kann nur zwey Hauptclassen von Philosophen geben: solche, welche das Vollkommnere aus dem Unvollkommenern hervorgehn und allmählig sich entwickeln lassen; und solche, welche behaupten, das Vollkommenste sey zuerst, und mit ihm und aus ihm beginne alles; oder: es gehen nicht voraus, als Anbeginn, eine Natur der Dinge; sondern es gehe voraus und es sey der Anbeginn von allem ein sittliches Principium, eine mit Weisheit wollende und wirkende Intelligenz—ein Schöpfer-Gott." Schelling quotes this same passage in his reply, S.W. I: 8, p. 62, omitting an unessential phrase (italicized above) and altering the punctuation somewhat. It is evident from Lovejoy's literal translation that he followed Schelling's looser citation rather than the original text.

<sup>54</sup> Lovejoy, p. 321, quoting Jacobi, p. 136 (= S.W. I: 8, p. 57): "Ailemal und nothwendig ist

In their original contexts, however, neither quotation refers to Schelling. Schelling manipulates both quotations in his reply with scant regard for context, and this may have misled Lovejoy as to the nature of Jacobi's refutation.

The first quotation occurs as part of a summary commentary on a passage from Aristotle. The contrast between naturalism and theism, Jacobi felt, is reflected in the problem of priority between intelligence and nature. Aristotle had reflected on this problem when he sought to clarify the relation between the good and the primordial nature.<sup>55</sup> Does the primordial nature contain what is truly good, or does the good arise at some later stage? Aristotle's contemporaries chose the latter alternative, as did the ancient poets who regarded Zeus rather than Chaos or Oceanos as the supreme god. These are the philosophers, Jacobi summarizes, who regard the more perfect as derived from or as gradually developing out of the less perfect.

The principle of formal logic Jacobi invokes in the second quotation is found toward the end of his discussion of Kant. He had already demonstrated to his own satisfaction that the dialectic of Kant's principles must result in an absolute monism such as Schelling's philosophy of identity,<sup>56</sup> even though this monistic tendency is entirely foreign to Kant's intent.<sup>57</sup> Kant had weakened his dualism between reason and understanding by denying reason's capacity as an independent source of knowledge. The postulates of practical reason, Jacobi feels, should rather be considered immediate and intuitive deliverances of the faculty of pure reason. The attempt to deduce such postulates is inherently absurd, since they are the highest deliverances of reason, and their deduction would require the necessary existence of more superior principles. It is in this context that Jacobi states his principle that the premise must be superior to the conclusion deduced from it. The existence of God, if it were deduced rather than be known intuitively, would require the existence of a causal ground having a superior reality to God.<sup>58</sup>

Whatever else it may be, *Von den göttlichen Dingen* cannot be construed as a polemic against Schelling's evolutionary theism.

#### IV

Schelling's reply, the *Schrift gegen Jacobi*,<sup>59</sup> is all that Lovejoy says it is. It is a biting, slashing attack with no other purpose than to demolish Jacobi. Schelling

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ja der Beweisgrund über dem, was durch ihn bewiesen werden soll; er begreift es unter sich, aus ihm fließen Wahrheit und Gewissheit auf das zu beweisende erst herab, es trägt seine Realität von ihm zu Lehn."

<sup>55</sup> *Von den göttlichen Dingen*, pp. 148 f. Jacobi quotes from the *Metaphysics*, N, 4, 1091a29-b10.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124 for summary.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 132-137. Cf. p. 137: "Desgleichen wenn das Daseyn eines lebendigen Gottes sollte bewiesen werden können, so müsste Gott selbst sich aus etwas, dessen wir uns als seines Grundes bewusst werden könnten, das also vor und über ihm wäre, darthun, ableiten, als aus seinem Princip evolviren lassen." Jacobi assumes that this alternative is obviously absurd, yet Schelling had argued in the essay on human freedom that God as *das Existierende* evolves out of that which is designated as its *Grund*. Jacobi's failure to argue this point in detail is another indication that he still had not yet read Schelling's essay in 1811.

<sup>59</sup> *F. W. J. Schelling's Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen etc. des Herrn Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi und der ihm in derselben gemachten Beschuldigung eines absichtlich täuschenden, Lüge redenden Atheismus* (Tübingen: J. G. Cotta, 1812). Reprinted in *S.W.* I: 8, pp. 19-136.

also treats *Von den göttlichen Dingen* as if it were a single-minded critique of the evolutionary theism which he was then beginning to espouse and proceeds to defend himself accordingly. He retracts nothing but develops the logic of explicative theism, pushing it further than ever before in his published writings. God is seen in terms of a temporal process with two extremes, an absolute beginning in *Deus implicitus*, in whom all perfections exist potentially, but none actually, and an ultimate culmination in *Deus explicitus*, a final synthesis containing all the divine perfections as actualized together with conserved values of the created order. The created world is involved in this divine process, not as its vehicle, to be sure, but as its principal product.<sup>60</sup> He attacks Jacobi's concept of God, the God of "ordinary theism," as incapable of explaining creation. If God is eternally perfect, "ready-made once for all," then he would have no reason for the creation of anything outside of himself. Since God would be then incapable of achieving any higher degree of perfection, he could only fall to a lower one through this act. Furthermore, all that we encounter in nature undergoes transformation, whether it be the growth of the individual or the evolution of the species.<sup>61</sup> Any theology which excludes such evolutionary process gives us "a God who is alien to nature and a nature that is devoid of God—ein unatürlicher Gott und eine gottlose Natur."<sup>62</sup>

Schelling even goes so far as to devise a logical counterthesis to Jacobi's claim that the principal premise, the *Beweisgrund*, must be superior to that which is to be proved: "Always and necessarily that from which development proceeds (*der Entwicklungsgrund*) is lower than that which is developed; the former raises the latter above itself and subjects itself to it, inasmuch as it serves as the matter, the organ, the condition, for the other's development."<sup>63</sup>

Lovejoy then concludes: "It is—as has too little been noted by historians—in this introduction of a radical evolutionism into metaphysics and theology, and in the attempt to revise even the principles of logic to make them harmonize with an evolutionary conception of reality, that the historical significance of Schelling chiefly consists."<sup>64</sup> This remark reveals both the strength and the weakness of Lovejoy's interpretation. Lovejoy has seen, more clearly than any other English commentator, that evolutionary or explicative theism forms the core of Schelling's real contribution to philosophy. On the other hand, he has posed the alternatives too sharply, regarding any attempts at mediation as inconsistent compromises: either God must be eternally complete or he must be perpetually evolving. Schelling emerges from Lovejoy's pages as the champion of a straight theistic evolutionism, since this alternative needs its champion. This is justified insofar as the *Schrift gegen Jacobi* does portray God almost wholly in terms of a temporal process. Yet by implication, at least, Lovejoy must present this work as truly representative of the mature

<sup>60</sup> See Fuhrmans, *op. cit.*, who signals this qualification as one of the basic differences between Schelling and Hegel.

<sup>61</sup> This is our phrase, but the thought is Schelling's. See Lovejoy, p. 323, quoting *S.W. I*: 8, p. 63.

<sup>62</sup> Lovejoy, p. 323, quoting *S.W. I*: 8, p. 70.

<sup>63</sup> Lovejoy, p. 325, quoting *S.W. I*: 8, p. 59.

<sup>64</sup> Lovejoy, p. 325.

Schelling. From this it is only a short step to the conclusion that the *Schrift gegen Jacobi* represents the crystallization of these characteristic themes for the first time, under the catalytic influence of Jacobi's polemic.

From his letters we know that Schelling himself did not attach such importance to the *Schrift gegen Jacobi*. He was preoccupied with the personal dimensions of the conflict, justifying himself on the grounds that it was better to bring it out into the open. We get the impression that he is simply restating a position already formulated, though perhaps not as yet published. There was hardly time for a carefully thought-out presentation, as Schelling wrote the entire polemic—215 pages worth—in the space of two months.<sup>65</sup> On November 12, 1811, Schelling had not yet seen Jacobi's book,<sup>66</sup> while by February 25th of the next year he can report that his reply had been published "a month ago."<sup>67</sup> Nor was it the occasion for inaugurating a new epoch in his thought. He was already hard at work on his magnum opus, *The Ages of the World*, and this polemical undertaking simply marked a brief interruption.<sup>68</sup>

*The Ages of the World* was an enormously ambitious undertaking which Schelling was never able to complete, despite the fact that he spent the better part of ten years working on the project. It essays nothing less than to describe the whole of time and eternity in terms of its three "ages," the Past, the Present, and the Future. The entire world-process from its creation to its consummation is contained within the Present. In the epoch of the Past, Schelling purports to solve that ancient riddle that vexed Augustine and Calvin: "What was God doing before the creation of the world?" Using a dialectic of dipolar tension, he describes the steady evolution of God out of the initial "absolute indifference" into a fully self-conscious being endowed with complete freedom of will and therefore capable of deciding either for or against the creation of the world. Of the three epochs, only the second is unambiguously temporal, for the first epoch, the Past, seen from a different perspective, seeks to describe God according to his essential and eternal nature, while the Future (never written) was to portray the final synthesis of the world-process seen from its eternal aspect as integrated within the divine life. The entire structure depends upon an exceedingly intricate theory of time which Schelling never succeeded in making clear. It is a moot point whether the theory is intelligible.<sup>69</sup> But what Schelling was after was clear enough: a concept of eternity rich enough to conserve the traditional values of simplicity and perfection while including within itself the entire temporal process as a subordinate diversity.

In other words, Schelling is not the champion of the purely temporal evolutionism

<sup>65</sup> Letter to Windischmann, Feb. 27, 1812 (Plitt, *op. cit.*, p. 294). Schelling apologizes, "dass sie besonders im Einzelnen viele Mängel hat und weit besser werden konnte, wenn sie nicht binnen zwei Monaten geschrieben und gedruckt wurde."

<sup>66</sup> See footnote 31 above.

<sup>67</sup> Letter to Wagner, Feb. 25, 1812 (Plitt, p. 292).

<sup>68</sup> Letter to Pauline Gotter, Feb. 25, 1812 (Plitt, p. 291): "Das Einzige, um dessen willen ich dem Buch feind bin, ist das es mich einen Monat gekostet und so viel Zeit meiner Hauptarbeit entzogen hat."

<sup>69</sup> Fuhrmans has not made this a central topic in his investigation of the *Weltalter*, but see Wolfgang Wieland, *Schellings Lehre von der Zeit* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1956).

that Lovejoy seeks. Schelling rejects the traditional notion of God as internally complete and self-sufficient, but he does not reject God's eternal simplicity. The task is rather to reinterpret the concept of simplicity so that it becomes inclusive rather than exclusive, and to discover a meaning for eternity which can include temporal process.

These thoughts both precede and follow after the *Schrift gegen Jacobi*. In 1810, mainly at the instigation of Georgii, Schelling gave a series of private lectures to a small circle of admirers in Stuttgart. These Stuttgart Lectures,<sup>70</sup> first published posthumously, give a good concise systematic account of Schelling's position just prior to *The Ages of the World*. The theme of explicative theism is prominently displayed. He even goes so far as to say: "Really the whole process of world creation, which continues as the life-process in nature and in history, is nothing but the process of God becoming completely conscious, completely personalized."<sup>71</sup> Nonetheless he recognizes that "eternal being" must be present in God as well as "eternal becoming," even though the two aspects are not yet well integrated with one another.<sup>72</sup>

Why, then, is there so little hint of Schelling's acceptance of the eternal dimension in the *Schrift gegen Jacobi*? I think the answer lies in matters of purpose and strategy. This polemic was intentionally one-sided, designed to destroy the argument that temporal process had no place within the divine nature. Schelling emphatically thought that it did, and he set out to show how. He also believed that this temporal process was included within the divine eternity, but this additional step required argumentation which went beyond the scope of the polemic. At the very least it required a brief presentation of Schelling's new theory of time, a thing he was then hardly able to do, being just in the throes of its initial formulation. Had he simply remarked that God was also simple, eternal, etc., these remarks would naturally be understood by his opponents in their traditional, "exclusive" meanings. At best he would be misunderstood; at worst he would be charged with gross inconsistency. Since the polemic was simply designed to demolish Jacobi, Schelling felt under no obligation to present all the facets of his understanding of God, and chose to concentrate on those aspects he conceived to be under direct attack.

One of Schelling's remarks to Georgii late in the year 1812 well illustrates the attitude with which he approached the *Schrift gegen Jacobi*:

It was also to be expected that they would all pounce upon the apparent affirmation of divine explication and development, and accuse me of heresy. I have to put up with that, since I can only clarify that point with reference to the total context of my position. I happen to believe that we must understand it literally: "I am he who *was*, he who *is*, and he who *will be*" (al-

<sup>70</sup> *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen*. Published in *S.W.* I: 7, pp. 309-484.

<sup>71</sup> *S.W.* I: 7, p. 433: "Wir können nun zum voraus sagen, dass eigentlich der ganze Process der Welterschöpfung, der noch immerfort der Lebensprocess in der Natur und in der Geschichte—dass dieser eigentlich nichts anderes als der Process der vollendeten Bewusstwerdung, der vollendeten Personalisirung Gottes ist."

<sup>72</sup> *S.W.* I: 7, p. 432: "Verlangen wir einen Gott, den wir als ein ganz lebendiges, persönliches Wesen ansehen können, . . . wir müssen annehmen, . . . dass in ihm neben dem ewigen Seyn auch ein ewiges Werden ist . . ."

though in these three periods the *same* eternal God). But this is an offence to our enlightened theologians.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Letter to Georgii, Dec. 8, 1812 (Plitt, p. 333): "Es stand auch zu erwarten, dass sie alle auf die scheinbar behauptete Entfaltung und Entwicklung Gottes losgehen und mich verketzern würden. Dies muss ich mir gefallen lassen, indem ich über diese Sache mich nur im ganzen Zusammenhang meiner Ansicht erklären kann. Ich glaube freilich, dass es *wörtlich* zu verstehen ist: 'Ich bin der da *war*, der da *ist* und der da *sein wird*,' (obgleich in diesen drei Perioden der *nämliche* ewige Gott). Dieses ist unsern aufgeklärten Theologen ein Ärgernis."